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PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDING
Pursuant to Utah R. of Appellate Procedure 24 (a)(l):
A.

Plaintiffs

Ryan Harvey ("Ryan") is an individual domiciled in and doing business in
Duchesne and Uintah Counties, Utah.
Rocks Off, Inc., ("Rocks Off') is a Utah corporation doing business in Duchesne
...i)

and Uintah Counties, Utah.
Wildcat Rentals, Inc., ("Wildcat") is a Utah corporation doing business in
Duchesne and Uintah Counties, Utah.
Plaintiffs are referred to collectively as (the "Harvey Parties").
B.

Defendants

The Ute Indian T1ibe of the Uintah and Ouray Reservation ("Tribe") is a federally
recognized tribe with reservation lands located in Uintah and Duchesne Counties, Utah.
Dino Cesspooch ("Commissioner Cesspooch"), is an appointed Ute Tribal
Employment Rights Office ("UTERO") Commissioner of the Ute Tribe, and is sued in
vii

his individual as well as his official capacity. Jackie LaRose ("Commissioner LaRose"),
is an appointed UTERO Commissioner of the
Ute Tribe, and is sued in his individual as well as his official capacity.
Sheila W opsock ("Director W opsock"), is the appointed Director of the UTERO
Commission, and is sued in her individual as well as her official capacity.
Newfield Production Company is a Delaware corporation engaged in the

111

exploration, development and production of crude oil, natural gas, and natural gas liquids
with production regions, employees, operations, and doing business, in Duchesne and
Uintah Counties, Utah.
Newfield Rocky Mountain, Inc. is a Delaware corporation engaged in the
exploration, development and production of crude oil, natural gas, and natural gas liquids
with production regions, employees, operations, and doing business, in Duchesne and
Uintah Counties, Utah.
Newfield RMI, LLC is a Delaware limited liability company engaged in the
exploration, development and production of crude oil, natural gas, and natural gas liquids
with production regions, employees, operations, and doing business, in Duchesne and
Uintah Counties, Utah.
Newfield Drilling Services, Inc. is a Utah corporation engaged in the exploration,
development and production of crude oil, natural gas, and natural gas liquids with
production regions, employees, operations, and doing business, in Duchesne and Uintah
Counties, Utah.
Newfield Production Company, Newfield Rocky Mountain, Inc., Newfield RMI,
LLC, and Newfield Drilling Services, Inc. are collectively refeffed to herein as
("Newfield").
L.C. Welding & Construction, Inc. ("L.C. Welding") is a Utah corporation.
Scamp Excavation, Inc. ("Scamp") is a Utah corporation.
Huffman Enterprises, Inc. ("Huffman") is a Utah corporation.
LaRose Construction Company, Inc. ("LaRose") is a Utah corporation.
IV

D. Ray C. Enterprises, L.L.C. ("D. Ray Enterprises") is a Utah limited liability
company.
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III. ARGUMENT
A.

The Tribe is not a Necessary Party.
The Tribe argues generally that it is a necessa1y party under Utah R. of Civ. P.

19(a), but provides little authoritative analysis as to why the T1ibe is a necessary patty.

(See generally, Brief of Appellees Ute Indian Tribe of the Uintah and Ouray Reservation;
L.C. Welding & Construction, Inc.; and Huffman Enterprises, Inc. (Tribe's Br.) at 17-22.
The party urging dismissal, in this instance, the Tribe, bears the burden of persuasion. See

Gildon v. Simon Prop. Grp., Inc., 158 Wn.2d 483, 495, 145 P.3d 1196, 1202 (2006)
(cited authority omitted). There is not a "precise formula" for determining whether a
party is necessa1y under Rule 19(a) and "[t]he determination is heavily influenced by the
facts and circumstances of each case." See Bakia v. Cnty. of Los Angeles, 687 F. 2d 299,
301 (9th Cir. 1982).
The Tribe argues that under Rule 19(a) it has an interest related to the subject of
the action and is so situated that the disposition of the action in its absence may as a
practical matter impair or impede its ability to protect that interest. Tribe's Br. at 18-20.

-.J

In determining whether this rule is met, the T1ibe must claim a legally protected interest
in the action and a determination must be made whether its ability to protect that interest
will be impaired or impeded. See Wilbur v. Locke, 423 F.3d 1101, 1112 (9th Cir. 2005),

abrogated on other grounds by Levin v. Commerce Energy, Inc., 560 U.S.413 (2010).
Central to the inquiry of whether the Tribe has a legally protectable interest in the
subject of the action is the situs and purpose of the tribal officials' actions at issue. The

Tribe disagrees and contends that, "The court therefore c01Tectly recognized that in
detennining whether the Tribe is a necessaiy party the issue is not whether the directive
purp01ted to regulate patties' activities off tribal lands, but whether the Tribe has an
interest in the detetmination of the scope and enforceability of its directives that are
designed to regulate tribal business relationships." Tribe's Br. at 18. Therefore, the
dubious proposition is that because the Tribe has a business relationship with Newfield, it
has an interest in issuing a directive that Newfield blacklist and boycott Plaintiffs'
businesses, even though Plaintiffs conduct no business on Ute Tribal land.

If the Tribe's argument is accepted, the Tribe would be a necessaty patty to any
action related to a directive issued by the Tribe, tribal officials or to any patty that has a
business relationship with the Tribe. As applied to the instant case, that would include
directives that oil and gas production companies participate in an unlawful blacklisting
and boycott of Plaintiffs that operate outside of Ute Tribal land, R. 558, whose Products
are used outside of Ute Tribal land, R. 553-55, and that oil and gas production
companies, such as Newfield, refuse to do business with any third patty doing business
with Plaintiffs. R. 559. The vety purpose of the directives at issue is to retaliate against
Plaintiffs because they refused to pay tribal officials' extottionist demands, to eliminate
Plaintiffs as competitors, or to divert work to Plaintiffs' competitors who will pay bribes
to the tribal officials. R. 561-562.
The Tribe's directives must be limited in scope to what is within the Tribe's
jurisdiction for the Tribe to have any legitimate or legally protectable interest in the
subject of this action. Likewise, tribal officials must not act beyond the scope of the
2

jurisdiction of the Tribe. The line of cases cited by Plaintiffs in the opening brief
confirms that tribal officials are not shielded by sovereign immunity for ultra vires
actions. Plaintiffs' Br. at 21-22. Directives issued that are ultra vires and result in
unlawful activity that occurs within the jurisdiction of another sovereign cannot be
shielded by tribal sovereign immunity. Otherwise, it would allow companies such as
Newfield to commit torts against state residents, with the actionable conduct taking place
within the state and outside of Tribal land, without recourse for damaged state residents
because the Tribe is a necessa1y and indispensable party to such actions. To the extent
any party, including tribal officials and Newfield, engage in tortious conduct within the
state and outside of Ute Tribal land, the party must be held accountable in the jurisdiction
where their unlawful actions occur.
Not only does the Tribe have no legally protectable interest under Utah R. of Civ.
P. 19(a) in the bribery, extortion, unlawful torts and other ultra vires actions of tribal
officials directed at non-Indian Plaintiffs' businesses whose activities take place outside
of Ute Tribal lands, the Tribe has failed to explain how the directives at issue fu1ther any
legitimate tribal interest. The Tribe has not even attempted to explain what tribal interest
would be furthered by the exto1tion, boycotting, blacklisting, and torts committed against
Plaintiffs. "The burden of presenting specific facts and reasoning that lead to the
conclusion that a party is a necessa1y or indispensable patty is on the party attempting to
persuade the cowt that patties are necessaty." Jennings Inv., LC v. Dixie Riding Club,
Inc., 2009 UT App 119, ,r 38, 208 P.3d 1077 (cited authority omitted).
The Tribe represents that Plaintiffs argue that the "trial court abused its discretion
3

because its mling is 'catastrophic' to Plaintiffs' business interests and those of others in
the area." Tribe's Br. at 20. The Tribe misunderstands Plaintiffs' argument. Plaintiffs'
provided case law showing tribal officials are not immune for ultra vi res acts as the acts
alleged in the instant case. By their inherent nature, if a tribal official's act is ultra vires,
the Tribe would have no legally protectable interest in the conduct under Utah R. of Civ.
P. 19(a). The body of case law cited by Plaintiffs would not exist if tribes were necessary
parties to litigation involving ultra vi res acts of tribal officials.
The Tribe argues that Plaintiffs are relying on doctrines, specifically Ex Parte
Young, 209 U.S. 123, 28 S. Ct. 44 (1908), that only apply to litigation in federal comis.

Tribe's Br. at 21. However, one of the cases cited by Plaintiffs, holding that sovereign
immunity does not extend to tribal officials when acting outside their authority in
violation of state law, was brought in state court. See Trump Hotels & Casino Resorts
Dev. Co., LLC v. Rocow, 2005 Conn. Super. LEXIS 1215 (Conn. Super. Ct. May 2,

2005). In addition, in Puyallup Tribe v. Dep 't of Game of the State o,f Washington, 433
U.S. 165, 168-172 (1977), the Comi held that a suit to enjoin violations of state law by
individual tribal members is pe1missible and does not implicate sovereign immunity. The
Comi further suggested that this includes suits against tribal officials brought in state
com1. Id at 171-173.
The Tribe argues that even if sovereign immunity does not extend to tribal
officials when acting ultra vires and in violation of state law, this does not affect the
necessary and indispensable party analysis under Utah R. of Civ. P. 19. Tribe's Br. at 2122. Plaintiffs respectfully disagree, and contend that the Tribe has no legally protectable
4

interest pursuant to Utah R. of Civ. P. 19(a) related to tribal officials' ultra vires and
unlawful acts violating state law when said acts occur within the state and outside of Ute
Tribal land. In shol1, the Tribe has no legally protectable interest under Rule 19(a) in the
extortion, bribery, boycotting, blacklisting, and other toits detailed in the Amended
Complaint.
B.

The Tribe is Not an Indispensable Party.
The doctrine of indispensability is rooted in equitable p1inciples. In Shields v.

Barrow, 58 U.S. 130, 139 (1855), the Court classified indispensable patties as those "who
not only have an interest in the controversy, but an interest of such a nature that a final
decree cannot be made without either affecting that interest or leaving the controversy in
such a condition that its final termination may be wholly inconsistent with equity and
good conscience." The Shields case led to the notion that unless complete justice can be
done a party is indispensable, which resulted in the 1ubber stamping of "necessary"
parties also being deemed "indispensable".
To counter this trend, the federal joinder rules were amended in 1966 to clearly
"condition [] a finding of 'indispensability' upon 'pragmatic considerations."' Schutten v.

Shell Oil Co., 421 F.2d 869, 873 (5th Cir. 1970) (cited authority omitted). Consideration
of whether a party is indispensable under Rule 19(b) "'calls for determinations that are
heavily influenced by the facts and circumstances of individual cases."' Gildon, 158
Wn.2d at 495 (citation omitted).
The Tribe quotes the trial court approvingly that, "A judgment rendered by this
comt in the Tribe's absence that purp01ts to limit the Tribe's ability to sanction or
5

exclude businesses from Tribal property for the reasons stated in the alleged
communication in this case creates a significant potential for prejudice against a key
interest in tribal self-governance." Tribe's Br. at 23. The facts and circumstances alluded
to by the Tribe, but not specified in its brief, are that tribal officials sent coffespondence
to oil and gas companies " ... telling the companies that they face sanctions under the
UTERO Ordinance if they continue to utilize Plaintiffs' products and services." R. at
2055.
The facts and circumstances pied in the Amended Complaint, and ignored by the
trial court and the Tribe in its brief, include that Plaintiffs do not conduct business on Ute
Tribal Land, R. 553-554, tribal officials sought to ext011 Plaintiffs at locations that are not
Ute Tribal Land, R. 557-558, tribal officials engaged in a pattern and practice of ext011ing
area businesses, R. 560, tribal officials received bribes from Plaintiffs' competitors, R.
561, tribal officials sought to eliminate Plaintiffs as competitors for business activities at
locations outside of Ute Tribal Land, R. 561-562, tribal officials initiated a boycott and
blacklist of Plaintiffs, R. 569-573, and the acts of the tribal officials were not done to
benefit the Tribe. R. 568. This is not a controversy that would make the Ttibe an
indispensable party under Rule 19(b).
Post Hagen v. Utah, 510 U.S. 399 (I 994), the exterior boundaries of the Uintah
and Ouray Reservation were abolished, resulting in a checkerboard of jurisdiction within
the Uintah Basin. In the instant case, all acts and occmTences took place at locations "...
outside of Indian Country and off reservation ... " pursuant to Hagen. R. 562-563. The
geographic limits of the Tribe's jurisdiction is settled law under Hagen and this
6

dete1mination is not prejudicial to the Tribe.
In addition, Plaintiffs have no other fomm to asse11 their claims. The acts and

occmTences at issue took place outside the geographical jurisdiction of the Tribe pursuant
to Hagen, supra. Consequently, the Tribe lacks subject matter jurisdiction and subject
matterjmisdiction cannot be waived. See Hardy v. Meadows, 264 P. 968, 974 (1928).
Not only does the geographical location of the acts and occurrences disqualify Ute T1ibal
comts as a possible forum, Plaintiffs are non-Indian and no exception under Montana v.

United States, 450 U.S. 544 ( 1981 ), exists that would subject Plaintiffs to the jurisdiction
of the Tribe.
The Tribe dodges this issue, and argues that Montana is inapplicable and the legal
tests are "Infringement" and "Preemption". Tribe's Br. at 27. In arguing infringement, the
Tiibe relies in error upon White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U.S. 136 (1980).
In Bracker, the State of Arizona sought to tax a logging operation "operating solely on
the Fort Apache Reservation." Id. at 138. The Com1 held that "the federal regulat01y
scheme [wa]s so pervasive as to preclude" additional state taxation, where "operations ..
.[we]re conducted solely on Bureau and tribal roads within the reservation." Id. at 148.
The instant case is distinguishable as the acts at issue occurred outside the geographical
jurisdictional limits of the Tribe. Likewise, the Tribe's reliance on Williams v. Lee, 358
U.S. 217 (1959), in arguing infringement is off point as the business operations at issue in

Williams occurred on the Navajo Indian Reservation. Id. at 217.
The U.S. Supreme Court considered factors that would also be applicable to
consideiing the equities under Utah R. of Civ. P. 19(b). In Hagen, supra, the Supreme
7

Com1 found the reservation was diminished and considered the following: (1) The area is
predominately populated by non-Indians; (2) A finding that the land remains Indian
Countty seriously burdens the administt·ation of state and local governments; (3) The
State of Utah has exercised jurisdiction over the lands open to non-Indian settlement from
the time the reservation was opened; and (4) That a contra1y conclusion would seriously
disrupt the justifiable expectations of the people living in the area. See Hagen, 510 U.S.
at 420-21.
Similar to the Tribe, Defendant Newfield ("Newfield") relies upon authority that is
off point such as Dawavendewa v. Salt River Project Agric. Improvement and Power
Dist., 276 F. 3d 1150 (9th Cir. 2002). Replacement Br. of Appellees Newfield Production
Co., Newfield Rocky Mountains, Inc., Newfield RMI, LLC, and Newfield Drilling
Services, Inc. ("Newfield Br.") at 40. Dawavendewa is distinguishable from the instant
case in that it implicated lease terms and the employment of Indians at the Navajo
Generating Station which was located on reservation lands. Id at 1153.
Newfield argues that the Tribe is a necessa1y and indispensable pat1y because "the
Tribe is free to enforce the directive as to the Newfield Defendants, regardless of any
Utah com1 finding of invalidity, putting them squarely between a 'rock and a hard
place."' Newfield Br. at 42. Under Newfield's reasoning, Tribal officials could insttuct
Newfield to transport illegal drugs for the officials within the State of Utah, and Newfield
could claim it was shielded from any legal jeopardy in Utah com1s due to the mandate of
the officials.
Defendants Dino Ray Cesspooch, Jackie LaRose, Sheila Wopsock, D. Ray C.
8

Enterprises, L.L.C. and LaRose Constiuction Company, Inc. (collectively in this reply
"DJS Defendants") also propound similar arguments in their brief ("DJS Brief'). DJS
Defendants argue that "[t]here is simply no precedent for using tort actions in one
jurisdiction to collaterally challenge official actions by gove1nmental officials in another
jurisdiction." DJS Br. at 11. However, the applicable principle is as follows. "A foreign
corporation doing business within the United States has no right to violate its policy or
laws. An agreement or combination which in pw-pose or effect conflicts therewith,
although actually made in a foreign countiy where not unlawful, gives no immunity to
parties acting here in pursuance of it. If Congress is powerless to prevent wrongs in its
own jurisdiction, when the actors are foreigners, or when done in pursuance of
agreements made abroad, its sovereignty is a myth." Brief for Appellant, United States v.

Am. Tobacco Co., 221 U.S. 106, 31 S. Ct. 632, 1911 U.S. LEXIS 1726, 24 (1911).
Previous United States Supreme Court decisions have ruled that a harm is committed
within the jurisdiction where the act of the patties actually takes effect, although the
instrumentalities may have been set in motion in another jurisdiction. See Benson v.

Henkel, 198 U.S. 1, 15-16, 25 S. Ct. 569, 572-73 (1905); see also United States v.
Thayer, 209 U.S. 39, 44, 28 S. Ct. 426, 427 ( 1908).
In sum, the Tribe will not be prejudiced if ti·ibal officials are restrained from ultra
vi res actions taken for the tribal officials' pecunia1y gain outside the geographical

jurisdictional limits of the Tribe. The Tribe's regulation of activities on tribal land would
not be affected. Finally, Plaintiffs will have no remedy if the action is dismissed for
nonjoinder as there exists no alternative forum.
9

C.

The Tribe Waived Sovereign Immunity by Making a General Appearance.

The issue of whether the Tribe waived sovereign immunity by making a general
appearance in this action is an issue of first impression. The Tribe argues that sovereign
immunity is more akin to subject matter jurisdiction than personal jurisdiction. Therefore,
the doctrines of special and general appearance do not apply. Tribe's Br. at 16. However,
like personal jurisdiction, sovereign immunity can be waived by conduct of a tribe during
litigation. See Warburton/Buttner v. Superior Court, 103 Cal. App. 4th 1170, 1184
(2002).
Utah comis have recognized that "an appearance by the defendant for any purpose
except to object to personal jurisdiction constitutes a general appearance." Barlow v.
Cappo, 821 P.2d 465, 466 (Utah Ct. App. 1991); see also RM L(festyles, LLC v. Ellison,

2011 UT App 290, ,I 20, 263 P.3d 1152 (noting that defendants who "argue[d] the merits
... waiv[ ed] any argument related to lack of personal jurisdiction").
Accordingly, in Chen v. Stelvart, 2004 UT 82, ,I,I 65, 72, 100 P.3d 1177, overruled
in part on other grounds by State v. Nielsen, 2014 UT 10, 326 P.3d 645, the Utah

Supreme Court held that entering an appearance and being substantively involved in the
early stages of a proceeding resulted in a waiver of personal jurisdiction. Id ,I,I 64-72.
Similarly, in Barlow, the holding was that a litigant waived personal jurisdiction by filing
a motion to dismiss for forum non conveniens. 821 P.2d at 466. The court noted that
"because [the litigant's] arguments did not pe1iain to the court's personal jurisdiction, ...
[he] conceded jurisdiction and submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the court." Id. at
467. See also Bel Courtyard lnvs., Inc. v. Wolfe, 2013 UT App 217, ,I 13,310 P.3d 747,
10

749.
In the instant case, the Tribe has made arguments that do not pe11ain to sovereign
immunity. For example, moving for dismissal on the grounds that Plaintiffs failed to
exhaust administrative remedies and moving for a stay of the action. By seeking this
affirmative relief the Tribe has waived sovereign immunity.

D.

The Complaint Provides Fair Notice of the Nature and Basis of the Claims.

Newfield argues that Plaintiffs' 31-page Amended Complaint fails to provide fair
notice of the basis of the claims. Newfield's Br. at 9-11. Under Utah's liberal notice
pleading, "[t]he plaintiff must only give the defendant 'fair notice of the nature and basis
or grounds of the claim and a general indication of the type of litigation involved."'

Canfield v. Layton City, 2005 UT 60, ,r 14, 122 P.3d 622 (quoting Williams v. State Farm
Ins. Co., 656 P.2d 966, 971 (Utah 1982)). "[T]he fundamental purpose of our liberalized
pleading rules is to afford parties the privilege of presenting whatever legitimate
contentions they have pertaining to their dispute .... [while leaving] issue-formulation ..
. to the []discovery process." Williams, 656 P.2d at 971 (internal quotation marks and
cited authorities omitted). "[T]hese principles are applied with great liberality in
sustaining the sufficiency of allegations stating a cause of action .... " Id at ,r 11.
The complaint is detailed and provides all of the defendants fair notice of the
nature and basis of the claims--as it relates to Newfield, that it cooperated with and
assisted tribal officials, who were acting ultra vires, in blacklisting, boycotting, and other
actionable tortious conduct directed at Plaintiffs. The sophistication and detail of
Newfield's analysis demonstrates that Newfield is on notice of the basis and nature of the
ll

claims pied. Lastly, "[i]n antitrust cases in particular, the [United States] Supreme Court
has stated that 'dismissals prior to giving the plaintiff ample opportunity for discovery
should be granted ve1y sparingly."' George Haug Co. v. Rolls Royce Motor Cars Inc.,
148 F.3d 136, 139 (2d Cir. 1998) (quoted authority omitted).
E.

Blacklisting.

Newfield provides an analysis and devotes most of its arguments to the elements
of Spackman v. Bd of Educ. of Box Elder Cnty. Sch. Dist., 2000 UT 87, 16 P.3d 533,
arguing the elements are not met. However, before the trial comi, Newfield never
asserted failure to satisfy the Spackman elements as justification for dismissal. R. 679680, 723. Further, the trial court never considered these elements in its order dismissing
the blacklisting claim. R. 2065-2066. It is unclear why Newfield believes the onus is on
Plaintiffs to defend grounds for dismissal never asserted before or relied upon by the trial
coUii or any of the defendants.
The entirety of the trial court's analysis on this claim is:
The Plaintiffs [sic] Amended Verified Complaint fails to allege facts
conce1ning the exchange of blacklists, or malicious inte1ference with
Plaintiffs' employment, on the part of Newfield. The pied facts
allege Newfield received an email from UTERO concerning Rocks
Off, and in compliance with the UTERO Ordinance governing work
done on tt·ibal grounds, Newfield no longer used Rocks Off as a
contractor or subcontractor. The facts allege that Newfield followed
the direction of UTERO by not using the Plaintiff for work
completed on tribal land because the Plaintiff was no longer licensed
to do work on tribal land. The Plaintiffs' cause of cause of action for
blacklisting is dismissed.
R. 2066.

The trial court's factual findings directly conflict with the facts alleged by
12

Plaintiffs. Specifically, Plaintiffs do not pe1f01m work on Tribal lands and the ".. .
actions complained of occuned outside of Indian Country and off reservation ... ". R.
553-555, 562, 563. Fmther, Newfield not only blacklisted Plaintiffs but also blacklisted
any third party that did business with Plaintiffs. R. 559, 563.
The Court's review of this issue should be limited to the grounds argued by the
defendants before the trial comi and grounds relied upon by the trial comi in dismissing
this claim. However, even if this Comi were to consider Newfield's belated reliance on
Spackman, Plaintiffs' pleading is sufficient to survive a motion to dismiss.

Newfield's reliance on Spackman, in arguing the propriety of the trial comi's
dismissal conflicts with a fair reading of the case. The Spackman comt instructed that
"[a}constitutional provision is self-executing if it articulates a rule
sufficient to give effect to the underlying rights and duties intended
by the framers. In other words, courts may give effect to a provision
without implementing legislation if the framers intended the
provision to have immediate effect and if 'no ancillary legislation is
necessary to the enjoyment of a right given, or the enforcement of a
duty imposed ... ' Conversely, constitutional provisions are not selfexecuting if they merely indicate a general principle or line ofpolicy
without supplying the means for putting them into effect.
In addition, a constitutional provision that prohibits certain
government conduct generally qualifies as a self-executing clause
'at least to the extent that courts may void incongruous legislation. '"

2000 UT 87, ,r,r 7-8 (quoted authorities omitted).
In the instant case, it is beyond reasonable dispute that the constitutional clause is
prohibitory. Further, the legislative history recited in Plaintiffs' opening brief makes it
clear that the framers intended the provision have immediate effect. Details of the
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legislative hist01y of the blacklisting provision can be found in Plaintiffs' opening brief,
at 39-42, and will not be restated here. This constitutional provision is self-executing.
Newfield argues that to assert a claim for damages based on a constitutional
clause, a plaintiff must also allege facts sufficient to establish the three Spackman
elements. Newfield Br. at 15. These elements are: (1) a flagrant violation of a plaintiffs
constitutional rights; (2) existing remedies do not redress his/her injuries; and (3)
injunctive relief is wholly inadequate to protect the plaintiffs rights or redress his/her
injuries. See 2000 UT 87, ,r,r 22-25.
Blacklisting and the exchange of blacklists are both expressly forbidden and
flagrant violations of Atticle XII § 19 and Article XVI § 4 of the Utah Constitution.
Blacklist is defined as "[t]o put the name of (a person) on a list of those who are to be
boycotted or punished." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 180 (8th ed. 2004). In the instant
case, tribal officials sought to punish Plaintiffs after Plaintiffs refused to pay a tribal
official's ext01tionist demands and to eliminate Plaintiffs as competitors. R. 548-579.
Newfield,

11
•••

based upon their cooperation with and supp01t of. .. 11 tribal officials,

blacklisted Plaintiffs and any third patty who utilized Plaintiffs' products. R. 558-559,
570.
"The principle underlying the legal right invaded, whether it is a combination of
employe[e]s and capitalists placing wage earners upon the black list, or a combination of
workmen placing employers upon the unfair list, is exactly the same. In either case, it is a
violation of the constitutional rights of the individual to pursue any calling he will, not in
violation oflaw, without feat· of force or oppression from his fellow men." Mulholland v.
14

Waiters' Local Union No. 106, 13 Ohio Dec. 342, 361 (Ct. C.P., Cuyahoga Cnty. 1902).

Blacklisting in the form of a group boycott is a practice of such pernicious effect, with no
redeeming virtue, that it is considered unlawful per se under the Sherman Act. See N
Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958).

As it relates to the second Spackman element, the Utah legislature has provided no
safeguards or remedies. Likewise, injunctive relief is wholly inadequate to redress
Plaintiffs' injuries. Plaintiffs have incmTed substantial monetary damages as a result of
the unlawful blacklisting of Plaintiffs. R. 559. Thus, even if Newfield's belated reliance
on Spackman is considered for the first time on appeal, Plaintiffs have pled sufficient
facts to satisfy the Spackman elements.
F.

Antitrust

In antitrust cases, where "the proof is largely in the hands of the alleged
conspirators, "dismissals prior to giving the plaintiff ample opportunity for discovery
should be granted very 'sparingly'." Poller v. Columbia Broad., 368 U.S. 464, 473
(1962). Newfield argues Plaintiffs' antitmst claim fails because the Amended Complaint
alleges no meeting of the minds. Further, Newfield accuses Plaintiffs of "concoct[ing]"
allegations to suppol1 the antitmst claims. Newfield Br. at 22.
The pleading speaks for itself and as it applies to Newfield provides: Since March
20, 2013, Newfield has blacklisted Plaintiffs and any third party who does business with
Plaintiffs; Newfield informed Plaintiffs that its refusal to deal with Plaintiffs or third
parties who do business with Plaintiffs is based upon their support of and cooperation
with tribal officials; Newfield's cooperation with the tribal officials empowers said
15

officials and is the direct and proximate cause of damages to Plaintiffs; and Newfield has
cooperated in the unlawful boycott of Plaintiffs and any third pai1y who deals with
Plaintiffs. R. 558-559, 569-570.
Newfield cites Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Serv. Corp., 465 U.S. 752 (1984), in
ai·guing that Newfield's refusal to deal with Plaintiffs constitutes "independent" as
opposed to "conceited" action. Newfield Br. at 20-21. "The crucial question is whether ..
. [the challenged anticompetitive conduct] stem[s] from independent decision or from an
agreement, tacit or express." Theatre Enters., Inc. v. Paramount Film Distrib. Corp., 346
U.S. 537, 540 (1954). "No express agreement, of course, is necessaiy to constitute an
unlawful combination or conspiracy. It is sufficient if persons, with knowledge that
concerted action was contemplated and invited, 'give adherence to and then participate in
a scheme."' Standard Oil Co. v. Moore, 251 F.2d 188, 211-12 (9th Cir. 1957) (quoted
authorities omitted). Often, conspiracies must be proven by circumstantial evidence.
However, in the case at bar, Newfield admitted to Plaintiffs engaged in the group boycott
in suppmt of and in cooperation with tribal officials.
The group boycott, also refetTed to as a refusal to deal, in the instant action is the
type of practice the United States Supreme Court has declared illegal per se. In Klar 's v.

Broadway-Hale Stores, 359 U.S. 207, 209 (1959), the Comt held that the concerted
boycott by defendants violated the Sherman Act, noting that "group boycotts, or
conceited refusals by traders to deal with other traders, have long been held to be in the
forbidden categmy". Id. at 212.

United States v. Gen. Motors Corp., 384 U.S. 127, 129 (1966), was an action to
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enjoin General Motors and Chevrolet dealers in the Los Angeles area from conspiring to
restrain trade. The associations of dealers sought to get the cooperation of General
Motors in order to eliminate competition by refusing to deal with discounters. Id. at 144.
The Court held that this was a conspiracy in restraint of trade to eliminate a class of
competitors and cited Klar 's, Inc., supra, for the proposition that the elimination by joint
collaborative action of businessmen from access to the market constituted a per se
violation of the Sherman Act. Id. at 144-45.
Newfield inconsistently argues that its compliance with a sovereign directive
negates any meeting of the minds. Newfield Br. at 22. Citing numerous authorities,
however, the Seventh Circuit instructed "that the 'combination or conspiracy' element of
a section 1 violation is not negated by the fact that one or more of the co-conspirators
acted unwillingly, reluctantly, or only in response to coercion." MCM Partners, Inc. v.
Andrews-Bartlett & Assocs., Inc., 62 F.3d 967, 973 (7th Cir. 1995) (quoted authmities

omitted).
Additionally, authority relied on by Newfield differs from the instant case. For
example, Fisher v. City of Berkeley, 475 U.S. 260, 261-262 (1986), concerned rent
controls established by a municipality and administered by a local agency. The Comt
found that these generally applicable standards lacked the element of concerted action. Id.
at 270. Fisher is distinguishable from the instant case on many levels. Primarily, in
Fisher, the State of California was not attempting to establish rent controls in the State of

Utah. Further, Fisher did not direct a blacklist or boycott of a specific individual or
entity.
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Newfield's contention is that because it was following the directives of tribal
officials, it is not responsible for its actions. As expressed in the Appellant's, United
States, brief in Am. Tobacco Co., supra, provides, "[a] foreign corporation doing business
within the United States has no right to violate its policy or laws. An agreement or
combination which in purpose or effect conflicts therewith, although actually made in a
foreign countiy where not unlawful, gives no immunity to patties acting here in
pursuance of it. If Congress is powerless to prevent wrongs in its own jurisdiction, when
the actors are foreigners, or when done in pursuance of agreements made abroad, its
sovereignty is a myth." 221 U.S. 106, 1911 U.S. LEXIS at 24. The United States
Supreme Court has made clear that a hatm is committed within the jurisdiction where the
act of the patties actually takes effect, although the instmmentalities may have been set in
motion in another jurisdiction. See 198 U.S. at 15-16; see also 209 U.S. at 44.
Newfield further argues, "Unilateral imposition of a policy followed by mere
acquiescence of others does not state a[n antitrust] claim." Newfield Br. at 30 (quoting

Re/Max Int'!, Inc. v. Smyth, Cramer Co., 265 F. Supp. 2d 882, 899 (N.D. Ohio 2003))
(cited authority omitted). In Re/Max, the defendants imposed an adverse split policy with
realtor agents who merely acquiesced in the policy. 265 F. Supp. 2d at 900. This
generally applicable policy is not compru·able to the instant case whereby the Plaintiffs
were specifically targeted for a group boycott and blacklist as competitors of tribal
officials and for refusing to pay tribal officials' extortionist demands, a per se violation.

Jeanery, Inc. v. James Jeans, Inc., 849 F.2d 1148 (9th Cir. 1988) and Glacier
Optical v. Optique Du Monde, 1995 U.S. App. LEXIS 1108, 1995-1 Trade cases P 70,
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878, 1995 WL 21565 (9th Cir. 1995) relied upon by Newfield are also distinguishable.
Both concerned a generally applicable retail price policies and unilateral termination of
price cutters. Am. Airlines v. Christensen also differs from the instant case in that at issue
were "independently set" and generally applicable terms. 967 F.2d 410, 413 (10th Cir.
1992). Tarrant Sen). Agency, Inc. v. Am. Standard, Inc., 12 F. 3d 609, 612 (6th Cir.
1993), is similarly off point because at issue was a generally applicable policy.
The instant case involves a specifically targeted boycott of Plaintiffs because
Plaintiffs refused to be extorted, are competitors of tribal officials, or compete with
companies willing to bribe tribal officials. Newfield "supported" and "cooperated" with
tribal officials in their targeted group boycott of Plaintiffs. The specific targeting of
Plaintiffs and the per se nature of the violations likewise differentiate the instant case
from Buetler Sheetmetal Works v. McMorgan & Co., 616 F. Supp. 453 (N.D. Cal. 1985)
and Suzuki of W Massachusetts v. Outdoor Sports hxpo, Inc., 126 F. Supp. 2d 40 (D.
Mass. 2001 ). Another distinguishing characteristic in the case at issue is that Newfield
not only boycotted Plaintiffs directly, it also admittedly refused to deal with any third
party who had dealings with Plaintiffs. R. 559.
G.

Civil Conspiracy

Similar to the antitrust claim, Newfield invokes a purported absence of any facts
showing a meeting of the minds. Newfield Br. at 34-35. As an initial point, Plaintiffs
need not allege (or prove) a meeting of the minds to plead a conspiracy claim so long as
they show 1) an overall unlawful plan or common design; 2) knowledge that others are
involved is inferable as to each member of the alleged conspiracy because of the party's
19

knowledge of the unlawful nature of the subject of the conspiracy (party's knowledge of
the part played by others, or the overall scope of the operation is not required); and 3)
each alleged member's pruticipation. Elder-Beerman Stores Corp. v. Federated
Department Stores, 459 F.2d 138, 146 (6th Cir. 1972) (cited authorities omitted).

In the instant case, the tribal officials sought Newfield's cooperation in the
unlawful blacklisting and boycotting of Plaintiffs, per se violations of the Utah
constitution and antitrust laws. Newfield admitted to Plaintiffs that, in "supp01t of' and
"cooperation with" these tribal officials, Newfield would not only directly boycott
Plaintiffs, but would also refuse to deal with any third patiy who had dealings with
Plaintiffs. R. 558, 559. Thus, in contradistinction to many conspiracies where a meeting
of the minds must be infetTed, Plaintiffs have alleged direct evidence of Newfield' s
admission that it was engaging in this course of unlawful conduct in conceit with the
tribal officials. When Newfield agreed to the blacklisting and boycotting of Plaintiffs,
there existed a meeting of the minds.
H.

Tortious Interference
Newfield argues that the tmtious inte1ference claim fails because the "improper"

means element cannot be met and that "Plaintiffs' amended complaint alleges no
violation of a statute, regulation, or recognized common law by the Newfield
Defendants." Newfield Br. at 37. Newfield's decision to boycott/blacklist Plaintiffs was
done, and admittedly so, at the behest of the tribal officials. R. 558-559. As to the
improper means element, Plaintiffs pled unlawful group boycott, unlawful blacklisting,
and bid-rigging in violation of Utah Statutes and its Constitution. R. 548-579.
20

I.

Supplemental Pleading

Newfield contends that the supplemental pleading was delayed. However, as
argued before the trial comt, the matter was stayed during the bulk of this time period and
the conduct at issue is continuing and expanding. "The supplemental pleading asserts
facts that show the continuing and expanding nature of the hmm caused by Defendants
that has intensified dming the interlocutory appeal [appeal to 10th Circuit] and stay
periods. Specifically, additional facts are detailed that demonstrates [sic] that not only is
Newfield assisting the UTERO Officials in unlawful conduct that has caused and is
continuing to cause damage to Plaintiffs, but that any customer seen removing Plaintiffs'
Products from Plaintiffs' sand and gravel pits, even for purposes unrelated to oil and gas
production and outside of Indian Country, risks being black balled by Newfield and oil
and gas production companies of similar mind .... Fmther, consistent with the factual
assertions of the Amended Complaint, the passage of time has proven that not only was
the intent of the UTERO officials to eliminate competition for their personal gain, these
defendants have been successful in their unlawful objective with the assistance of the
Newfield Defendants. The result of these officials' ultra vires acts [sic], is that as of
December 2015, only named Defendants were allowed to bid on Newfield projects with
all competitors effectively eliminated." R. 1695.
There was no delay, and the facts asserted occurred as late as December 2015 with
the motion to supplement being filed February 8, 2016. R. 1469. There can be no delay in
asse1ting facts that had not yet occurred during the period the action was stayed at the
request of the defendants. Given the continuing nature of the hmm, the fact that discovery
21

has not commenced and not a single defendant has answered the Amended Complaint,
refusal of the trial court to allow supplementation of the pleadings is an abuse of
discretion.

J.

Misrepresentation of Facts Pied

DJS Defendants generally represent that the facts pied in the Amended Complaint
are that "all" of the actions taken by the Individual Defendants that harmed Plaintiffs took
place on Ute Tribal lands. DJS Br. 7-8, 11-12. A reviewing com1 is '"obliged to constme
the complaint in a light most favorable to the plaintiff and to indulge all reasonable
inferences in its favor."' Heiner v. S.J Groves & Sons Co., 790 P.2d 107, 109 (Utah Ct.
App. I 990) (quoted authority omitted). Facts alleged in the Amended Complaint that
conflict with the DJS Defendants' representations include: All Plaintiffs' business
operations take place outside of Ute Tribal lands; Plaintiffs' Products are used outside of
Ute Tribal lands; The actions complained of by Plaintiffs occmi-ed outside of Ute Tribal
lands; Plaintiffs were harassed, threatened, bullied, and intimidated at locations outside of
Ute Tribal lands; The defendants threatened to confiscate Plaintiffs equipment located
outside of Tribal lands; Attempts to extort Plaintiffs occurred outside of Ute Tribal lands;
Plaintiffs and any third party who dealt with Plaintiffs were blacklisted and boycotted by
the local oi1 and gas industty; Third patties who used Plaintiffs equipment outside of Ute
Tribal Lands were threatened to be blacklisted and boycotted; and Plaintiffs were
eliminated as competitors of businesses that operated outside of Ute Tribal lands. R. 553571.
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K.

The State District Court Should Not Defer to a Jurisdictional Determination

of the Tribal Court when the Action was Commenced in State Court.

DJS Defendants argue that the Tribal Comi must first determine jurisdiction. DJS
Br. at 14-15. DJS Defendants cite Iowa Mut. Ins. Co. v. LaPlante, 480 U.S. 9 (1987), and

Strate v. A-1 Contractors, 520 U.S. 438 (1997), in support of this proposition with little
analysis. DJS Br. at 14. LaPlante, supra, is off point. It was an action brought in federal
district court against tribal members asserting diversity of citizenship as the basis for
jurisdiction. 480 U.S. at 11. The accident at issue occmTed within the boundaries of the
reservation and an action was pending in tribal comi at the time the action was filed in
federal district court. Id.
Meanwhile, the instant action was commenced in state district court, a court of
general jurisdiction, as opposed to federal district comis of limited jurisdiction, and the
acts complained of occurred at locations outside of the reservation. Fmiher, there was no
pending tribal comi action at the time the action was filed in state district court. Like the
ttibal court, the state district comi is tasked with determining subject matter jurisdiction.
Where the situs of the acts at issue is within the State of Utah and outside of Ute Tribal
land, the basis for the state court's jmisdiction is set forth on the face of the Amended
complaint.

Strate, supra, is similarly distinguishable. In Strate, the action was commenced in
tribal comi, and, during the pendency of the tribal court action, an action was brought in
federal district court. 520 U.S. at 444. In Strate, the automobile accident at issue occurred
on a state highway running through the Fort Betihold Indian Reservation. Id. at 442. In
23

the instant case, the acts complained of occurred off reservation, the action is filed in
state coutt, and there is no pending tribal comt action. R. 563.

L.

Interpretation of the UTERO Ordinance is Not Necessary Because Plaintiffs'

Argument is that the Situs of the Acts Complained are Beyond the Geographical
Jurisdictional Limits of the Ute Tribe.
DJS Defendants' argument that a"[ d]etermination of [w ]hether the [i]ndividual
[d]efendants [a]cted fi.1}ltra [v]ires is [o]utside the [j]urisdiction of the Utah State
Comts," DJS Br. at 21, is a red herring. Plaintiffs' argument is that the tribal officials, for
their own pecuniary gain, engaged in conduct beyond the jurisdiction the Tribe may
bestow. If the conduct occurred beyond the jurisdiction the Tribe is capable of bestowing,
that conduct is also beyond the appropriate application of the UTERO ordinance or any
tribal ordinance for that matter.

M.

Facts Alleged in the Amended Complaint Satisfy Pleading Requirements for

Claims Against DJS and Company Defendants.
DJS Defendants cite Trump Hotels & Casino Resorts Dev. Co, LLC v. Rosow,
2005 Conn. Super. LEXIS I 2 I 3, No. X03CV034000160S, 2005 WL 1273260 (Conn.
Super. Ct. May 2, 2005), in arguing that Plaintiffs failed to plead specific facts to provide
that the tribal officials acted without any colorable claim of authority. DJS Br. at 22-23.

Trump Hotels provides in relevant part:
... in order to overcome sovereign immunity, the [plaintt[O must do
more than allege that the defendants' conduct was in excess of their .
. . authority; they also must allege or otherwise establish/acts that
reasonably support those allegations.
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Id. at 37-38.

Facts set forth in the Amended Complaint provide specific allegations that
demonstrate that the tribal officials acted beyond their authority and for their own
pecuniary benefit, and can be found at R. 553-573. Likewise, the Company Defendants
are put on reasonable notice of the claims against them. Id.

IV. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiffs respectfully request that this Court reverse
the trial court's decision in its entirety and remand the case back to the trial court.
DATED this 28th day February, 2017.

Isl John D. H
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J. Preston Stieff
Craig H. Howe
J. Preston Stieff Law Offices
Miller Toone, P.C.
110 South Regent Street, Suite 200
165 South Regent Street
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
Via U.S.P.S and Via Email
Via U.S.P.S and Via Email
jps@sticfflaw.com
howe@millertoone.com
Attorney for Ute Indian Tribe of the Uintah and Ouray Attorney for Dino Ray Cesspooch, Jackie LaRose,
Reservation; L.C. Welding & Constntction, Inc.; and
Sheila Wopsock, D. Ray C. Enterprises UC, and
Huffman Enterprises, Inc.
LaRose Construction Company, Inc.
Daniel S. Press
1050 Thomas Jefferson St, NW
Washington, DC 20007
Via U.S.P.S and Via Email
dsp@vnf.com
Attorney for Dino Ray Cesspooch, Jackie LaRose,
Sheila Wopsock, D. Ray C. Enterprises LLC. and
LaRose Construction Company, Inc.

Calvin M. Hatch
Patrick S. Boice
1457 East 3300 South
Salt Lake City, UT 84106
Via U.S.P.S and Via Email
calvin(cl:hatch-law.com:patrick@boice-la,v.com
Attorneys for Dino Ray Cesspooch, Jackie LaRose and
Sheila Wopsock

Utah Supreme Court
450 South State Street, 5th Floor
P.O. Box 140210
Salt Lake City Utah 84114-2010
Via Email
supremecourt@utcourts.gov

Scamp Excavation, Inc.
1555 West 750 South
Price, Utah 8450 I
Via U.S.P.S.
Defendant

Christopher R. Hogle
222 S. Main Street, Suite 2200
Salt Lake City, UT 84101
Via U.S.P.S and Via Email
crhogle@.ho llandhart. com;
Attorneys/or Newfield Production Company, Newfield Rocky Mountains, Inc., Newfield RMI, LLC and Newfield
Drilling Services Inc.

/s/ Brooke Anderson
Legal Assistant for John D. Hancock Law Group, PLLC
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